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DISCRETION TO REFUSE JURISDICTION OF ACTIONS
FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
By EDWIN BORCHARD*
S EVERAL distinguished insurance lawyers have in recent years
charged that the federal courts, in a few insurance cases,
had erroneously declined to assume jurisdiction of declaratory
actions, notwithstanding the presence of the jurisdictional facts.
It is their view that the jurisdiction is mandatory. The latest
of such complaints is embodied in an article of Mr. E. R. Morri-
son, "Federal Declaratory Actions and Casualty Insurance," pub-
lished in the University of Kansas City Law Review for June
1941.' The grievance is directed particularly at the cases of
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles- and American Auto-
mobile Ins. Co. v. Freundt-both of which I believe were cor-
rectly decided-and the supposedly harmful influence exerted
by these opinions on other cases. Mr. Morrison seems convinced
of the soundness of his criticism by reason of the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Pacific Coal & Oil Co. and Joe Orteca.4
It was at one time assumed that a federal court having juris-
diction must exercise it.5 In certain actions in personam it had
been commonly remarked that even the bringing of a similar
action in the state would not oust the federal court of jurisdic-
tion.6 Yet certain fairly recent decisions of the Supreme Court,
*Professor of Law, Yale University.
1(1941) 9 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 211. See also bibliography in Borchard,
Declaratory Judgments (2d ed. 1941) 312, n. 2.
-(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1937) 92 F. (2d) 321.
3(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1939) 103 F. (2d) 613.
4(1941) 312 U. S. 270, 61 Sup. Ct. 510, 85 L. Ed. 826.
5Cohens v. Virginia, (1821) 6 Wheat. (U.S.) 264, 404, 5 L. Ed. 257.6Kline v. Burke Construction Co., (1922) 260 U. S. 226. 43 Sup. Ct.
79, 67 L. Ed' 226; Armour & Co. v. Miller, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1937) 91
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even in law or equity cases, should have put the insurance lawyers
on their guard, 7 the Supreme Court having cited these cases
to the proposition that obligatory jurisdiction "has been qualified
in certain cases where the federal courts may, in their discretion,
properly withhold the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon
them where there is no want of another suitable forum."8
The broad reasons given by the Supreme Court for this quali-
fication, to be found in "considerations of convenience, efficiency
and justice," are especially applicable to the declaratory action
because (1) it is not an action strictly legal or equitable but sui
generis; (2) because the Uniform Act, merely codifying the
general rules of law on the subject, specifically provides that "the
court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or
decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered,
would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to
the proceeding." 9 This is as much a part of the, federal law under
the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act as if it had been expressly
enacted, as is the provision that the "purpose" of the Uniform
Act "is to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and in-
security with respect to rights, status and other legal relations." 10
Equally inherent in the remedy is the rule that in principle the
declaration must serve a useful purpose. 1' These are broad stan-
dards and their application necessarily vests a considerable "dis-
cretion" in the courts, state and federal, to determine whether
such a useful purpose is served.
The criticism of the insurance lawyers is directed to the re-
fusal of the federal courts in a few cases to entertain jurisdiction
of an action of the company for exoneration from liability under
the policy when the record showed that a suit against the insured
for negligence was pending in the state courts. The circumstances
of the case would have enabled the company, without prejudice, to
make its defense under the policy in the state courts or there was
F. (2d) 521; 1 Moore, Federal Practice (1938) 227. The tendency of
modern legislation, like the Johnson Acts of 1934 and 1937, is to restrict
the federal jurisdiction.
7Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, (1932) 285 U. S. 413.
422, 52 Sup. Ct. 413, 76 L. Ed. 837; Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. of
New York, (1933) 288 U. S. 123, 130. 53 Sup. Ct. 295, 77 L. Ed. 652: cf.
Cohen v. American Window Glass Co.. (C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1942) 126 F.(2d) 111, by Clark, J.
8Massachusetts v. Missouri, (1939) 308 U. S. 1, 60 Sup. Ct. 39, 84 L.
Ed. 3.
9Sec. 6.
1OSec. 12.
"Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d ed. 1941) 279, n. 1,
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
some other reason which made it seem appropriate to allow the
state jurisdiction to be exercised unhampered by a simultaneous
federal suit for contractual immunity. It is these decisions which
the insurance lawyers believe erroneous.
In the vast majority of the cases the institution of an autono-
mous suit for company exoneration from the duty to defend or
pay a judgment against the insured in the state action for negli-
gence serves a valuable purpose, of importance also to the injured
person, since the state suit may not proceed if it is known that
the insurance company, often the only financially responsible
entity, never incurred or is released by the insured's breach of
warranty or conditions from all liability. The question of policy
for the courts is whether jurisdiction of the company's declaratory
suit for non-liability or exoneration should be assumed or de-
dined, in the latter event forcing the company (a) to assert its
immunity then or later in connection with its defense to the
negligence action against the insured, from which duty it claims
complete exemption; or (b) to risk standing on its conviction
of immunity, let the negligence action, perhaps improperly or
even collusively defended by the insured, go to judgment and
then make its defense under the policy in a supplemental pro-
ceeding for indemnity on the judgment (under statute in some
states) or in an action by the insured or injured person in garnish-
ment, or, under some statutes, directly or jointly wvith the insured.
An immediate decision on the vital question of coverage or
company release under the policy is often necessitated by the
fact that the company is unable to obtain from the insured a
non-waiver agreement, by which, in defending the insured, it
reserves its own defenses under the policy. It would therefore
enter upon the defense of the state suit in tort, in many states,
having unequivocally waived any policy breaches and its de-
fenses thereunder, and would expose itself not only to the ex-
pense of defense but to a judgment against the insured. It must
either disavow all liability or accept the full defense . 22 Waiver
and estoppel bar the assertion of policy defenses.1 3 If it fails to
defend the state suit and stands on its exemption under the policy,
it runs an even greater risk, not only of damages for breach of
contract but of a large adverse judgment, since the suit is likely
12Di Francesco v. Zurich General Accident and Liability Ins. Co.,
(1926) 105 Conn. 162, 134 At. 789; Beatty v. Employers Liability Assur-
ance Corp., (1933) 106 Vt. 25, 168 At!. 919.
13Webb, The Liability of the Insurance Company When It Takes Full
Charge of the Investigation and Defense, (1935) 2 Ins. Counsel Journal 83.
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to be inadequately defended, if at all, by the insured. While some
of the company's defenses under the warranties may be known at
once, others, like notice, lack of cooperation, carrying for hire,
etc., may not be fully disclosed until the tort action has been
begun. In those states where the policy defense may be reserved
notwithstanding unwillingness of the insured to sign a non-waiver
agreement, or where a waiver is only a presumption which may
be overcome, the insurer risks at least the expense and costs of
the defense and, unless a state statute limits the insurer's defenses
in then contesting the judgment against the insured, he may later
have to litigate with the judgment creditor and the insured the
question of exemption under the policy.
The courts have recognized this dilemma of the insurer, and
have not only granted an independent declaration on the crucial
question of coverage and company exoneration under the policy,
but until late years occasionally granted an injunction against
the prosecution of the state action until the preliminary and vital
federal issue had been determined. While such injunctions are
now no longer possible,'14 a matter to be referred to hereafter,
judicial economy has not thereby been promoted. The insurance
lawyers, not satisfied with the great advantages they have won
by the opportunity to institute an independent action for non-
liability, have tempted fate by complaining of the few cases in
which the federal courts have declined, by refusing jurisdiction,
to interfere even indirectly with a state suit already pending
involving identical issues. They have also on occasion brought
into the federal courts by declaratory action issues which were
appropriately sub judice in the state courts, and have thereby
aroused prejudice against the insurance companies and against
the procedure itself." It is believed that these complaints and
abuses are due to the fact that the declaratory action has been
misunderstood and that its justifiable limitations have not been
perceived. The misconception has been promoted by the assump-
tion that the recent Supreme Court decision in Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co."6 holds that the grant of a declaratory
judgment is obligatory when the jurisdictional facts are present.
This is not justified.
The Maryland Casualty v. Pacific Case was a typical federal
14Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1941) 313 U. S. 538. 62 Sup.
Ct. 139, 85 L. Ed. 1507.15Maryland Casualty Co. v. Boyle Construction Co., (C.C.A. 4th Cir.
1941) 123 F. (2d) 558, 566. Cf. infra p. 691.16(1941) 312 U. S. 270, 61 Sup. Ct. 510, 85 L. Ed. 826.
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action for a declaration of non-liability for lack of coverage
brought against the insured and the injured person, one Orteca.
Orteca, who had begun a state action in Ohio against the insured,
moved in the federal action to be dropped as a defendant, on the
alleged ground that a controversy had not yet arisen between
Orteca and the insurance company. The circuit court of appeals
granted the motion.1 7 This view, had it been sustained, would
have had a disastrous effect on actions of this kind, since the
federal judgment would not have terminated the issue of policy
coverage, the injured person remaining unbound, with the further
effect that if and when the injured person sought to enforce his
state judgment against the insurance company under supple-
mental process or otherwise, different interpretations of the policy
might be announced by federal and state courts. The United
States Supreme Court therefore reversed the circuit court of
appeals, holding that there -was a substantial controversy betwveen
the company and Orteca and that he was properly joined as
defendant with the insured."' This question of the joinder of the
injured person as a necessary or proper party defendant was the
only one on which there had been an identifiable conflict between
decisions of the circuit courts of appeals and the only one on which
certiorari was granted.
The mere fact that both insurer and injured person were vital
parties in interest, even had they been only potential adversaries,
should have sufficed to produce justiciability. This is not the
place to criticize the general narrowness of the Supreme Court's
view on the question of justiciability;19 but it is not believed, in
spite or because of the Court's refusal to enjoin the state action,
that there was any avowal by the Supreme Court that a declara-
tory action in insurance cases, as Mr. Morrison has assumed, was
obligatorily within the jurisdiction of the federal courts. While
saying nothing on this subject, it could as readily be concluded
that the Court realized the discretionary character of the jurisdic-
tion and the remedy but considered it properly exercised in the
case before the Court. The fact is not overlooked that the word
"discretion" is ambiguous, and that while it affords the courts
some leeway in determining when a useful purpose will be served
'7(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1940) 111 F. (2d) 214, 215.
'
58"Basically, the question in each case is whether . . . there is a sub.
stantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests, of suf-
ficiint immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judg-
ment. . .. That the complaint in the instant case presents such a con-
troversy is plain!' 61 Sup. Ct. 510, 512.
IsBorchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d ed. 1941) pp. 33 et seq.
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Ly assuming jurisdiction, and obviously by granting the relief
sought, the discretion is not an uncontrolled and unreviewable
discretion, but has been hardened by experience into rule, so that
we can reasonably well establish under what circumstances the
Court is or is not justified in taking jurisdiction of a federal
declaratory action. The very fact, however, that the special
circumstances of each case must be examined before a definite
conclusion can be ventured makes it seem desirable to retain the
concept of discretionary jurisdiction, classifying cases under the
criterion of the propriety or impropriety of using the discretion to
assume or refuse jurisdiction in particular cases. Typical situa-
tions undoubtedly develop from this effort to classify facts, and
in such cases it is not improper to suggest that discretion has
hardened into rule. Since the state and federal issues in the
Maryland Casualty Company Casc were not the same; and since
a useful purpose was served by trying separately the single yet
crucial question of coverage under the policy, the Supreme
Court obviously was correct in assuming jurisdiction of the com-
pany's federal suit.
2 0
II.
We may assume that the broad scope of the power conferred
upon the courts to render declaratory judgments empowers them
to determine when a declaration will serve a useful purpose. We
may also assume that an autonomous suit by an insurance com-
paniy asserting non-coverage is usually entertained, certainly
where the company, as indicated above, suffers any prejudice or
disadvantage by being relegated to its defenses in the state suit
for negligence. The important question is to determine when tie
refusal to exercise full jurisdiction is proper and when it is im-
proper. Experience has now given us perhaps a hundred cases
from which conclusions and opinions may be appropriately drawn.
20A similar preliminary question of coverage or company's exonera-
tion from defending for insured's breach of warranty was involved in the
following federal suits: Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, (C.C.A.
4th Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 665; Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Garrow
Co.. (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1942) 125 F. (2d) 462. aff'g (S.D. N.Y. 1941)
29 F. Supp. 100: Central Surety & Insurance Corp. v. Caswell, (C.C.A.
5th Cir. 1937) 91 F. (2d) 607: Central Surety & Insurance Corp. v.
Norris. (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1939) 103 F. (2d) 116; Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Consumers Finance Service, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1938) 101 F. (2d) 514; Mary-
land Casualty Co. v. United Corp.. (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1940) 111 F. (2d) 443:
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Krejci. (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1941) 123
F. (2d) 594; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Pierson. (C.C.A.
8th Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d) 560: Standard Ace. Ins. Co. v. Meadows, (C.C.A.
5th Cir. 1942) 125 F. (2d) 422.
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We know, for example, that the refusal is proper where a state
action is already pending which can easily adjudicate the entire
issue between and among all the parties in interest, a fact which
it is believed was present in the Quarles Cas 2' and also in the
recent case of Maryland Casualty Co. v. Boyle Construction Co.22
Federal jurisdiction is also properly refused where it is sought
to foreclose the rights of absent injured parties by an uncontested
suit by insurer against insured in which the insured connives with
the insurer or supplies the evidence to enable him to establish "no
coverage" or to decide crucial issues of fact by default;3 or in
a case where great inconvenience to several persons would be
caused by compelling them all to defend a federal action for im-
munity; :4 or where the declaratory procedure is used for pro-
cedural fencing or to harass the defendants.- To permit federal
jurisdiction in such cases has been regarded as an abuse of power,
and in such cases the companies have properly been relegated to
their defenses in the state court.
While it is unusual to decline federal jurisdiction of an inde-
pendent suit by the insurer placing in issue the sole question of
coverage, there may be attendant facts which justify the federal
court in declining to segregate that issue. The pendency of a state
suit for negligence alone is not a sufficient ground for declining
federal jurisdiction. But if such suit involves the identical issues
and complete justice can be done to all parties, including the
insurer, by leaving the matter to the state courts, there seems no
reason to accept for trial a subsequently brought federal suit on
the issue of coverage. When the issues are to be deemed "iden-
tical" will presently be examined.
Thus, by way of example, federal jurisdiction has been prop-
"'Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1937)
92 F. (2d) 321. It was presumably not present in Associated Indemnity
Co. v. Manning, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 362, where statejudgments had already been obtained, and Maryland Casualty Co. v. The
Texas Co., (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1940) 114 F. (2d) 952. Note, Declaratoryjudgments and Judicial Discretion, (1941) 9 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 440.22(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 558.
2 State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hugee, (E.D. S.C. 1940)
32 F. Supp. 665, aff'd on other grounds, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1940) 115 F.(2d) 298.
24bid.
--Continental Casualty Co. v. National Household Distributors. (E.D.
Wis. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 849; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Brannen. (S.D. lo-a
1940) 31 F. Supp. 123; American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Freundt. (C.C.A.
7th Cir. 1939) 103 F. (2d) 613; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lee, (C.C.A.
5th Cir. 1941) 117 F. (2d) 735, cert. denied, petitioner dismissed certiorari.(1941) 313 U. S. 601; Thompson v. MIoore, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1940) 109 F.(2d) 372.
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erly exercised where no state action was pending, where though
pending it would not have completely adjudicated the rights or
some crucial rights of all the parties in interest because the
insurer was not an actual or imminent party or because the issue
of coverage or company immunity was not immediately involved,
i.e. where the issues are not identical, or where all the necessary
parties were not joined in the state action ;26 where an accounting
between the petitioning company and another company or other
parties was required ;27 where the state remedy for any reason was
deemed inadequate; where the state court could not get jurisdic-
tion over all the necessary parties ;2'1 where a multiplicity of state
negligence actions made it seem desirable to adjudicate the ftnda-
mental issue of company liability before the state suits were
carried to completion;-O or where the company would suffer
prejudice or jeopardy in being forced to assume a defense in the
state suit while denying any liability under the policy."'
But the court's discretion is not properly used when the dechtra-
tory action is dismissed because the defendant might sue the
insured in some future action ;12 or because the court erroneously
assumes that a "demand to defend" is a condition of a company's
declaratory action denying the duty to defend ;3 or that judgment
against the insured is a condition precedent to a federal "case or
controversy" or of a declaratory action denying the obligation
26Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d ed. 1941) 654 and 660; Asso-
ciated Indemnity Co. v. Garrow. (S.D. N.Y. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 100;
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Errett, (E.D. N.Y. 1940) 32 1.
Supp. 237.2"Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hubbard and Employers Liability Assur-
ance Co., (S.D. Cal. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 697. Aitken in (1938) 17 Neb. 1.
Bull. 107, 114, 116.2 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Consumers Finance Service, (C.C.A. 3d
Cir. 1938) 101 F. (2d) 514; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Koch, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 288 (long delay in state pro-
ceedings).
29Supra, n. 26.
3oContinental Casualty Co. v. National Household Distributors, (E.I).
\Wis. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 849.3 1Aetna Casualty Co. v. Yeatts, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d)
665, at p. 669. Or where it would lose its defense tinder the "contestable
clause," Aitken, in (1938) 17 Neb. L. Bull. 107. 116. Or where assignment
was made solely to escape federal jurisdiction. Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. v.
England. (W.D. Mo. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 284. In Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v.
Meadows, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1942) 125 F. (2d) 422, Judge Hutcheson as-
sumed federal jurisdiction while considering the company also bound to
defend the pending state suit, the first decided being res judicata on the
issue of coverage.32 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1940) 108 F. (2d)
824; N. E. Life Ins. Co. v. Weyenberg, (E.D. Wis. 1939) 29 F. Supp. 177.
83State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hugee, (E.D. S.C. 1940)
32 F. Supp. 665.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 685
to pay a judgment found against the insured ;:" or that the court
lacks "jurisdiction" merely because a state action for negligence
is pending;35 or for other errors in law.38 There is no "discretion"
to refuse to assume jurisdiction over a case which is properly
before the court and -which is entirely appropriate for declaratory
adjudication. This is doubtless what was meant by Circuit Judge
Charles E. Clark, sitting as District Judge, in his opinion in the
case of Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Garrow Co.3 a refusal
which, had it taken place, is called by the affirming circuit court
of appeals, an "abuse of discretion."3' s
III.
Let us now look at the cases which Mr. Morrison believes
were wrongly decided, and whose influence he seems to think is
pernicious. In the Quarles Case3" Mrs. Quarles had in a South
Carolina court sued her husband, the insured, for injuries sus-
tained in an automobile accident while her husband was driving.
The casualty company was called upon to defend. Thereupon the
company began its federal suit for a declaratory judgment that
34Merchants Mutual Casualty Co. v. Leone, (1937) 298 Mass. 96.
9 N. E. (2d) 552.35Sweeney, J. in Maryland Casualty Co. v. United Corp., (D. Mass.
1939) 29 F. Supp. 986, rev'd (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1940) 111 F. (2d) 443, also
in (D. M'ass. 1940) 35 F. Supp. 570. See also Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Martin.
(C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1940) 108 F. (2d) 824, dismissed below "for want ofjurisdiction!' Cf. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Rhanie, (E.D. S.C. 1940)
32 F. Supp. 59. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Tindall, (W.D. Mo. 1939) 30
F. Supp. 949, 951 wrongly considered no "case or controversy" because
state action pending. Aff'd on other grounds, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1941) 117
F. (2d) 905.36Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Howell, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1939)
108 F. (2d) 148 (refusal of lower court to permit amendment of petition
called "abuse of discretion"); Pennsylvania Threshermien & Farmers Mut.
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Gorsuch, (Baltimore, Md., Superior Court, 1940) 6
C. C. H. (Auto Cases) 1204 (the court cites most of the dubious, over-
ruled and criticized cases to dismiss the suit of one insurance company
against others to establish petitioner's proportionate duty to pay insured
in a complicated situation, advancing as reasons the untenable ground that
there was no privity of contract between the several insurance companies
and the defendants; that there was a remedy in the suit at law on the poli-
cies, that there was .inadequate "interest" for joinder of defendants; that
consolidation of independent disputes and parties is not sanctioned; that
declaratory judgments do not relate to torts; that there is no community
of interest among defendants; that declaratory practice excludes the adjudi-
cation of "fact unmixed with law ;" and that court has "discretion" to
dismiss).37(S.D. N.Y. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 100, citing particularly Maryland
Casualty Co. v. United Corp., (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1940) 111 F. (2d) 443.
38(C.C.A. 2d Cir. 1942) 125 F. (2d) 462.39Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1937) 92
F. (2d) 321.
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inasmuch as the insured had failed to cooperate with the company
in defending what the company considered a collusive suit-
alleged policy breach-the company was not bound to defend or
pay any judgment recovered against the insured. While the
declaratory action was pending Mrs. Quarles recovered judgment
against her husband and sued the insurance company thereon. A
motion to dismiss had theretofore been filed in the declaratory
action. After hearing this motion the petition was amended to
show the recover), of the judgment and the institution of a suit
against the insurance company in the state court. In that situa-
tion the district court, affirmed by the circuit court of appeals
through Judge Parker, concluded that it would be better to let
Mrs. Quarles' South Carolina suit against the company go to
trial and not to draw practically the identical action with parties
reversed into the federal courts. Mr. Morrison4" seems to think
it an operative fact that Mrs. Quarles' suit against the company
had been instituted after the declaratory action was filed-irrele-
vant in this case-and charges, erroneously, it is believed. that
the right of the insurance company was determinable by the situa-
tion as it existed at the time the declaratory action was filed."
Judge Parker states, after concluding that the rendering of a
declaratory judgment is under the law discretionary:
"The question is not as to whether jurisdiction shall be assumed
but as to whether in exercising that jurisdiction a discretion exists
with respect to granting the remedy prayed for. No one would
question the power of the federal courts to grant inilunctio)Is in
proper cases ; but nothing is better settled than that whether or not
injunctive relief shall be granted is a matter resting in the sound
discretion of the trial judge. The same is true of specific per-
formance and of the legal remedy of mandamus. The declaring
(,f 'rights and other legal relations' without executory or coercive
relief is an extraordinary remedy the granting of which like the
remedies mentioned should certainly rest in the sound discretion
of the court because of the liability of abuse to which it might
:therwise be subjected."
A few comments may be made on this quotation. First, the
court might safely have said that the federal courts do not need
to entertain jurisdiction-not merely grant the remedy, which
obviously is discretionary-if no useful purpose could thereby be
served, and from the imminence of the supplemental action on
40(1941) 9 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 211. 222.
4lThis may be a correct statement in some cases-Anderson v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co.. (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 345-but is not true
in all cases.
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the judgment against the company, there seemed no reason to take
the case out of the hands of the state court. Second, it was an
inadvertence, corrected in other cases, to consider the declaratory
action "an extraordinary remedy," since if that were so it would be
necessary to show that no ordinary remedy is available. As Judge
Parker says, quoting the report of the Senate Committee, the
procedure is neither distinctly at law nor in equity but sui generis.
If it were purely equitable it would be necessary to show that no
adequate remedy at law is available, and clearly such a showing
is quite unnecessary.4 2 If it were an extraordinary remedy it
would not be an alternative remedy and that it distinctly is, not-
withstanding the attempt of the Pennsylvania and Maryland
courts to consider it a remedy to be used only when no other
remedy is available.43 Twenty years of effort have gone into dis-
sipating this erroneous assumption, which conflicts with the ex-
press wording of the statutes and with Federal Rule 57.44
Mr. Morrison may be more correct in challenging the sug-
gestion of the Court that the federal action would be a "piecemeal"
trial, a conception which has been misused in some cases to deny
the opportunity to segregate the important issue of coverage and
thus to question the propriety of an autonomous suit for the
exoneration of the company. As Mr. Morrison says, the declara-
tory action would have disposed of the controversy in the Quarles
Case in its entirety and not by piecemeal, and as to both husband
and wife, whereas in fact Mr. Quarles was not a party to the
.wife's suit against the company, and presumably would not be
bound by any adjudication therein. And yet it is probable that in
view of the history of the litigation, it was preferable at that
advanced stage of the proceedings to leave the adjudication of Mrs.
Quarles' complaint against the company to the state court. This
was not a question of coverage but of defenses for policy breach,
and the court has some discretion in determining whether it is
more appropriate to make those defenses in the state court or make
them the subject of a separate declaratory action in the federal
court.
In the "Freundt Casc- 5 which Mr. Morrison believes to have
been unfortunately influenced by the Quarlesl decision, the de-
42Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Krejci, (C.C.A. 7th Cir.
1941) 123 F. (2d) 594.
43Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d ed. 1941) 318 et seq.
44C. a good note in (1941) 19 N. Y. U. L. Quar. Rev. 70.
4SAmerican Automobile Ins. Co. v. Freundt, (C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1939)
103 F. (2d) 613.
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fendant, Freundt, the party injured, had obtained a judgment
against the insured in Illinois and proposed to file garnishment
proceedings against the insurance company under the Illinois
statute. Before such proceedings were instituted, however, the
company brought a federal action against Freundt and the insured
jointly for a declaration that the policy did not cover the car in-
volved in the state suit and asked exoneration. The District Court
dismissed the bill on the ground that the company's defenses
would be available in the state court action and should be relegated
to trial in that forum.4"
In the circuit court of appeals4" Judge Treanor affirmed the
decision below dismissing the petition in what he called the exer-
cise of a "sound judicial discretion." He says that it was not
intended to use the federal Act to enable a party to accomplish
"what could not be accomplished under the removal act"
47
"-a
questionable dictum. Nor, said he, should the declaratory action
be used "as an instrument of procedural fencing either to secure
delay or choose a forum." Mr. Morrison correctly says that the
power to institute an independent declaratory action is not gov-
erned by the supposed power to remove, which as a rule is open
only to non-residents. He denies the charge of "procedural
fencing." But he stands on the view that the state proceedings
are not in the least affected by the plaintiff's right to institute a
federal declaratory action, and refers to the frequency of con-
current suits. But therein lies a misapprehension of the function
of the declaratory action, which is designed to promote judicial
economy and not to multiply the adjudication of identical issues.
The company being a party to the state supplemental proceedings,
it suffered no perceptible disadvantage at that stage in making
its defense in the state court. Had it been in the dilemma of
defending the original state action only tinder risk of losing or
jeopardizing the defense of no-coverage or even of incurring ex-
penses from which it claimed immunity, a federal action for
exoneration would in theory have been permissible. It is not
known why the company did not begin its federal declaratory
action before the state negligence suit had progressed to judgment.
Mr. Morrisorn's assumption that the federal jurisdiction is
obligatory in the presence of the jurisdictional facts, leads him to
46Mr. Morrison erroneously belie'es this to be in violation of Federal
Rule 57, but as observed below, this is inaccurate.
47(C.C.A. 7th Cir. 1939) 103 F. (2d) 613, 614.
47'Quoted in Thompson v. Moore, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1940) 109 F.
(2d) 372.
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conclude that these cases were wrongly decided. He seems to
believe that the pendency of two cases, state and federal, involving
the identical issues presents no opportunity for the exercise of
discretion not to proceed with the federal suit. In that he is -be-
lieved to be in error. Nor is it believed to be true that the Pacific
Coal & Oil Case before the United States Supreme Couri4s over-
ruled the decision in the Freuizdt Case, although it is barely pos-
sible that under the facts the circuit court of appeals might now
allow the federal action to proceed to judgment. It depends on the
view taken of the effect of-a state judgment, to be followed by
supplemental proceedings, on the federal action. It is a fact that
the Supreme Court in the Pacific Case by implication held the
casualty company to have a right to maintain its action in the
federal court notwithstanding the injured party's right to proceed
by supplemental proceedings in the state court if he obtained judg-
ment for damages. It may be that the first decision on the segre-
gated issue of coverage would become res judicata. But the issues
in the negligence suit were not the same as the'federal issues under
the policy, and it was for that reason that the federal suit could
properly survive. The point involved in the Pacific Coal & Oil
Case, namely, the propriety of the joinder of the injured person,
could not have been passed upon had the Court been willing to
say that under no circumstances could the Maryland Casualty
Company institute a federal action. In the Freundt Case it may
well be that "considerations of couivenience, efficiency and jus-
tice" 49 justified the court in concluding that the state proceeding
should be left undisturbed and no concurient jurisdiction assumed.
It is not possibleto pass upon these questions in the abstract. The
state of the calendars of the state and federal courts, respectively,
and the utility of the declaratory action, have something to do
with- the court's conclusion. But in any event there is some dis-
cretibn in the federal courts in determining-certainly near the
very end of the proceedings--which is the more appropriate forum,
although experience with decided cases gives us a fair indication
of when the declaratory action in the federal courts ought not to
be dismissed.
While the Freundt Case bears some similarity to the Pacific
Coal & Oil Con-fany Case, it is proper to note-that in the Freundt
Case judgment had already been recoveredby the injured person
48(1941) 312 U. S. 270, 61 Sup. Ct. 510, 85 L. Ed. 826.
49Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. of 'New York, (1933) 308 U. S. 1.
60 Sup. Ct. 295, 84 L. Ed. 3.
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against the insured, and that garnishment proceedings were about
to begin. In the'Pacific Coal & Oil Company Case, on the other
hand, no judgment had yet been obtained against the insured,
thus affording much more justification for an independent declara-
tory action on the issue whether the truck causing the injury had
been "hired by the insured," a subject of dispute in both cases.
The only substantial issue before the Supreme Court was the
question whether in the federal suit the company had stated a
cause of action against Orteca, the injured person. This by no
means goes to the root of the question whether in a particular
case the court should assume federal jurisdiction. The suit in
Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Ryan 0 had actually gone
to judgment in the Ohio state court and was therefore subject
merely to supplemental proceedings against the insurer. The
circuit court of appeals might well therefore have exercised its
discretion not to entertain at that stage a separate suit by the
insurance company on its defense issue of the adequacy of the
notice of injury."' The dissenting opinion of Judge Allen called
attention to that fact. The majority was clearly in error in assum-
ing that the pendency of a state suit which might eventually have
decided the issue was within the terms of Federal Rule 57 by
which "the existence of another adequate remedy does not pre-
clude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appro-
priate." That is a misconception of the meaning of Rule 57, as
will be shown below.
Based upon his view that the Quarles and Freundt Cases were
wrongly decided, Mr. Morrison5 2 also objects to the decision in
Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Brannew.'3 That case in-
volved two life insurance policies in the face amount of $2500
each. The beneficiary had brought one suit on both policies in the
state court. This was removed to the federal court by the com-
pany and there dismissed on motion of the beneficiary for the
purpose of enabling him to bring individual suits on each policy
in the state court, thus preventing removal. Thereupon, the insur-
•o(C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1940) 109 F. (2d) 690.
511t cannot be said categorically that judgment against the insured in
the state court is a bar to the company's federal declaratory action for
non-liability. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Martin, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1940) 108
F. (2d) 824( effect of state judgment) ; U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Koch, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 288 (delay in executing statejudgment); Associated Indemnity Co. v. Manning, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1939)
107 F. (2d) 362 (question unnoticed).
52(1941) 9 U. -Kan. City L. Rev. 211, 225.
53(S.D. Iowa 1940) 31 F. Supp. 123.
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ance company filed an action for a declaratory judgment disclaim-
ing liability. This suit also the beneficiary successfully moved to
dismiss. District Judge Dewey conceded that he had jurisdiction
of the federal action but thought that it should properly be left
in the state court in the exercise of an admitted discretion. He
deprecated "an unseemly scramble between the attorneys as to
which court should hear and determine the case." Noting the con-
current jurisdiction, he called attention to the fact that the federal
court would not have another jury in that district until the fall,
by which time the state court would very likely have reached a
decision. These grounds he thought adequate to sustain his
view that state jurisdiction was the preferable one. Since Mr.
Morrison denies the discretionary power to decline jurisdiction,
he probably would not concede that judicial economy supports the
court's decision or at least makes it impossible to say that the
discretion was improperly used.'-
Even less questionable is the recent decision of the fourth
circuit court of appeals in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Boyle Con-
struction Co.55 Here a non-resident insurer had sought a declara-
tory judgment that the decedent whose death resulted from an
automobile accident was an employee of the insured and that the
exclusive remedy for his injuries and death lay under the South
Carolina *Workmen's Compensation Act. This identical issue
was pending in an action by the administrator against the insured
in the South Carolina court. judge Parker in a long opinion,
after holding that realignment was proper and therefore federal
jurisdiction absent, deals with the question whether the federal
court should under the facts have assumed jurisdiction at all. He
concludes that since the identical issue was already pending in
the state action, there was no useful purpose served by transferring
the issue to a federal court and permitting two courts, possibly
differently, to decide one issue-even if the first decision reached
is res judicata. He says that had there been a bona fide controversy
over the meaning or coverage of the policy or over the question
of its validity or expiration, he would have had no qualms about
rendering a declaratory judgment in an action against the insured
and the injured person, but he considered this action an effort of
54Similar preference for an already invoked state jurisdiction on
identical issues was displayed in Western Supplies Co. v. Freeman. (C.C.A.
6th Cir. 1940) 109 F. (2d) 693, 695 (patent licenses); and Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Bohlken. (W.D. Mfo. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 494 (federal suit v.
assignor deemed equivalent to state suit of assignee v. company).55(C.C.A.,4th Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 558.
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the insurance company to drag into tile federal court tile trial of a
cause which was properly pending in the state court and was
not subject to removal. While paying tribute to the Federal De-
claratory Judgments Act as "an important development in pro-
cedural law," which should be "liberally construed," he adds-
perhaps influenced by the effort to convert a state suit into a
federal suit-"if these efforts are persisted in and are sanctioned
by the courts, such abuse of the remedy may well lead to the
repeal by Congress of one of the most beneficent pieces of pro-
cedural legislation enacted in recent years."5
IV.
Proponents of the mandatory theory of federal jurisdiction
proceed from certain major premises, some of which have already
been noticed. The assumption that federal jurisdiction may not
be denied notwithstanding the pendency of an identical state
suit5 7 overlooks the effect and weight of those considerations
which led to the adoption of the declaratory action, namely, con-
venience, expediency, need, desirability, public interest or policy.
These considerations necessarily import the employment of dis-
cretion, so that as opposed to the general though by no means uni-
versal rule in actions at law or in equity, the action for a declara-
tory judgment in the federal courts does not lie automatically but
only where a useful purpose will be served. Such a useful purpose
is served in those cases where a preliminary separate federal suit
for a declaratory judgment goes to the root of the question of
coverage. As was stated in Maryland Casualty Co. v. United
Corp. of Massachusetts,8 such a suit can determine once and for
all (1) that the insurer is or is not under an obligation to defend
the action in the state court; (2) that the insured, if held liable in
the state negligence action, is or is not entitled to indemnity under
the policy; and (3) if the injured persons obtain judgment against
56(C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 558, 566.
5 71n a dictum it was remarked by one of our best federal judges that
even identical issues would not bar the federal suit. Carpenter v. Edmonson,
(C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1937) 92 F. (2d) 895, 897. This was a relatively early
case. See criticism in Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d ed. 1941)
659. In Standard Ace. Ins. Co. v. Meadows, (C.C.A. 5th Cir. 1942) 125 F.
(2d) 422, the federal issue of coverage might have been deemed included
within the larger issues pending in the state suit. Federal jurisdiction was
taken. Perhaps there was good reason for permitting the two suits in
Rydstrom v. Massachusetts Accident Co., (D. Md. 1938) 25 F. Supp.
359 to be tried simultaneously.
5-(C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1940) 111 F. (2d) 443.
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the insured in the state action, that they will or will not be entitled
to proceed against the insurer.
More difficult questions arise when the company places in
issue by an autonomous suit the adequacy of its defense because
of contract breach by the insured. Here an intelligent appreciation
of the status of the state action is required to determine how far
it has proceeded toward judgment, whether the insurer is a party
to the state action, whether there is any inconvenience to the
insurer in making his -defense in the state action, and whether
convenience would be served by permitting a federal action which,
though dealing with a company defense, might nevertheless serve
all parties concerned in deciding a fundamental issue at the very
beginning. Again, the condition of the record, of the state of
the respective calendars, of the motive for bringing the federal
action, of the balance of convenience to be served, are essential
criteria. No categorical rule can be laid down governing all cases.
In most of these dual suits, for negligence in the state court,
for exoneration in the federal court, the issues or the parties are
not identical, so that there is little difficulty in allowing the federal
action to proceed. The greater difficulty arises where the issues
and the parties are partly identical, although it is not believed that
priority 9 as between the state and federal suit is a conclusive
criterion of jurisdiction. Presumptions may arise against federal
jurisdiction when the state action has already been begun, and in
favor of such jurisdiction when it has not. But when are issues
identical? The identity of issues is not always easy to determine,
especially as the question is usually presented on a motion to dis-
miss the federal action. In view of the fact that at that stage the
federal issues have not yet been formulated, no answer having
been filed, and in view of the fact that the federal court generally
could hardly have had an opportunity of examining the pleadings
in the state case, and that in either case, the pleadings and issues
might be amended before trial, it seens somewhat precarious on a
motion to dismiss to assume an identity of issues.60
It is also asserted by proponents of the mandatory theory that
the pendency of an identical state action is no ground for denying
59District judge Trimble in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Roe, (W.D.
Ark. 1938) 22 F. Supp. 1000 was in error in sustaining the motion to
dismiss the declaratory action because defendants would probably bring a
suit to establish double indemnity liability. Cf. reversal in (C.C.A. 8th
Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 28; Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Grimmett, (W.D.
La. 1939) 32 F. Supp. 81.6oCf. R. W. Shackleford in (1939) 6 Ins. Counsel Journal 38, 43; 3
Moore, Federal Practice (1938) 3224.
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declaratory relief, since Federal Rule 57 expressly states that
"the existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a
judgment for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate."
As already observed, the mere pendency of a state suit is in fact
no ground for denying declaratory relief, since the full facts must
be known about the state suit before it can be said that the federal
declaratory action would serve no useful purpose. But to invoke
Federal Rule 57 in this connection is an error, as was pointed out
above in discussing the Ryan Case. Federal Rule 57 was designed
by its author to overcome the mistaken view of a few state de-
cisions to the effect that the declaratory action was an exclusive
remedy not to be employed when another remedy was available.
As stated elsewhere.6 ' this is a misconstruction of the words of
the statute, which provide that declaratory relief may be granted
even though coercive relief could have been asked or obtained.
This is perhaps the most profound error in the administration of
the Acts occasionally still made by a few state courts. But it does
not refer to what a court might do if another action were actually
pending. Federal Rule 57 refers to unused remedies which might
be available, but not to those which have actually been invoked in a
pending case.
In this connection it has been sometimes said that New York
Rule 212612 was intended to indicate that the New York courts had
discretion to decline a declaration where another action was avail-
able. This has been denied by the New York court of appeals,o
and is in contradiction with the relevant philosophy and learning. 4
If rule 212 meant that the existence of another remedy was suffici-
ent to empower the court to deny declaratory relief, it would not
have required the court to state its reasons for declining a declara-
tion, nor made those reasons reviewable on appeal. The truth is
that the other remedy which might bar declaratory relief must
6t Borchard, Declaratory Judgments (2d ed. 1941) 315 et seq.
62"Jurisdiction discretionary. If, in the opinion of the court, the par-
ties should be left to relief by existing forms of actions, or for other
reasons, it may decline to pronounce a declaratory judgment, stating the
grounds on which its discretion is so exercised." Connecticut Civil Prac-
tice Book, sec. 250 (c) provides that the superior court will not render
declaratory judgments "where the court shall be of the opinion that the
parties should be left to seek redress by some other form of procedure."63Woollard v. Schaffer Stores Co., (1936) 272 N. Y. 304, 311, 5 N. E.
(2d) 829, 832 ". . . we have never gone so far as to hold that. when
there exists a genuine controversy requiring a judicial determination the
Supreme Court is bound, solely for the reason that another remedy is
available, to refuse to exercise the power conferred by section 473 and
Rule 212."64Note, (1941) 19 N. Y. U. L. Quart. Rev. 70.
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be a better and a more effective remedy, which would accomplish
more complete relief or take in more parties or broader aspects
of the case. It would include a special statutory proceeding de-
signed for that special type of case. 5 Such considerations might
persuade the court to regard another remedy as more effective or
appropriate than declaratory relief in a particular situation.
The express mention of this power in the New York and
Connecticut rules and in sec. 6 of the Uniform Act"0 should not
lead to any inference that less discretion is afforded the federal
courts in denying declaratory relief. The New York and Con-
necticut rules and the Uniform Act merely codify the accepted
learning on the subject,0 7 which is necessarily to be applied in the
federal courts. The suggestion of proponents of the mandatory
theory that the silence of the federal Act implies an intent to
reject the rule of discretion 68 is without foundation.
V.
It is thus apparent that the declaratory action imparts a quali-
fication upon the usual rule that where federal and state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction, actions in personam may proceed
concurrently."9 The declaratory action is not a suit either at law
or in equity, but is a mode of prophylactic relief designed to ac-
complish a useful social purpose by simplifying procedure. It is
especially useful as a vehicle to establish exonerations from liabil-
ity. In examining the question whether a concurrent state action
should bar federal declaratory relief, the inquiry should not be
directed primarily to the question whether the state relief fulfills
a useful or adequate purpose, but whether the federal declaratory
action subserves such a purpose. If it does not and merely con-
stitutes duplication of judicial effort, federal jurisdiction should
be declined. Under the precedents this would occur in rare cases
only, where the identical issues could be more effectively and
speedily determined in a pending state action without handicap to
the federal plaintiff.
65Cf. the exhaustive opinion of majority and dissenting judges in
Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, (App. D.C. 1941) 124 F. (2d) 335.
on the effect" of proceedings before National Railway Adjustment Board
on power of employer to institute declaratory action.
66Supra, p. 678.
67The Committee Note to Federal Rule 57 provides "... the Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act affords a guide to the scope and function of
the federal Act"
BaM orrison, (1937) 23 A. B. A. Jour. 793.
691 Moore, Federal Practice (1938) 227.
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In the earlier days of the federal declaratory action, the federal
courts, realizing the crucial character of the issue of coverage.
had on occasion granted injunctions against the prosecution of the
state negligence suit pending the determination of the federal
question. In more recent times, however, the federal courts have
been more disposed to give literal effect to see. 265 of the Judicial
Code and have denied their power to enjoin the prosecution of the
state actions. They were confirmed in this view by the categorical
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Toucey
Case.- But a view so absolute may result in an unseemly race
for priority in decision, including demands for advancement oil
the federal calendar. It does not exemplify economy in judicial
administration. The interests of insurer, insured, and the injured
person ought all to be safeguarded. The extraordinary judicial
solicitude for state sovereignty-not evident in the political depart-
ments of the federal government-ought to yield to an efficient
administration of justice in a country that after all is one. The
writer has therefore suggested some relaxation in the rigidity of
the prohibition against injunctions, and has proposed that either
by statute or modification of judicial attitude the following rules
be adopted:
1. Where no state suit has yet been begun and the federal
action will conclusively decide, without undue delay, the issue of
coverage or company liability-or, better still, the tort question also
-an injunction should issue.
2. Where a state suit has been begun and the company is
making its defense without restrictions, the whole issue being
involved, no federal jurisdiction at all should be exercised.
3. Where the state suit has been begun, but the company has
reserved by a non-waiver agreement or, in its absence. under
state law, the question of its liability under the policy and has
begun a federal action for a declaration of contractual immunity,
the federal court should issue an interlocutory injunction of short
duration, say for three months, until the federal case can be
decided in the district court. If the decision is in favor of policy
exemption. the injunction may be extended until the circuit court
of appeals and the Supreme Court. if certiorari is granted, decides
the issue. If the decision in the district court is against the exemp-
tion, the injunction should be dissolved and the state suit be
permitted to proceed, the company risking the expense of the
7OToucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., (1941) 313 U. S. 538, 62 Sup.
Ct. 139. 85 L. Ed. 1507.
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suit and costs, even during the pendency of the.federal appeal. In
any event, if the company's defenses to the policy appear to the
court from the pleadings or other circumstances not meritorious,
no injunction should be granted.
4. State laws or state judicial policy should, where necessary,
be changed so as either (a) not to compel the company to waive
its policy defense against the insured merely by defending the
tort action for negligence, whether a non-waiver agreement is
obtained or not, or (b) where the declaratory judgment action for
immunity under the policy is pending, 'whether state or federal,
the tort action should be stayed for a short period while provision
is made for speeding the decision of the declaratory action for
contractual immunity.
VI.
The principle involved in concurrent actions for declaratory
and coercive relief is well illustrated in two cases which recently
came before the circuit court of appeals for the third circuit,
Judge Mars writing the opinions. The concurrent suits, both in
the federal courts, but in different districts, were, on the one hand,
for declaratory judgment of non-infringement and, on the other,
for patent infringement. 1 In each case, the declaratory action
was brought first, and since it could adjudicate all the issues in-
volving the validity of the patent, the parties being in both cases
the same, Judge Mars gave priority to the declaratory action and
permitted an injunction to be issued against the continuation of the
infringement suit.
On the other hand, in the second case" the later infringement
suit in Michigan was deemed to involve more issues (damages
for infringement) and more parties (licensees and customers),
so that Judge Mars had no hesitation in denying the district court
in Delaware, having jurisdiction of the declaratory action, the
privilege of enjoining the prosecution of the infringement suit in
Michigan, since it was bona fide. Indeed, he authorized the dis-
missal of the suit for declaratory judgment.7"
-'Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 925.
2Triangle Conduit and Cable Co. v. National Electric Products
Corp., (C.C.A. 3d Cir. Nov. 19, 1941) 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 57.5.73He added, "It is well settled that the granting of declaratory relief
is .not mrandatory but lies in the discretion of the court. This is a legal
discretion, however, and it must not be exercised arbitrarily but rather in
accordance with fixed principles of law. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Koch, (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 288; Samuel Goldwyn, Inc.
v. United Artists Corp., (C.C.A. 3d Cir. 1940) 113 F. (2d) 703."
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In a recent action in the tenth circuit court of appeals,' a
reinsurance company upon whom claims had been made by the
insured, the original policy having been taken out in a company
that had since become insolvent, disclaimed liability for the policies
of the insolvent concern. The reinsurance company plaintiff had
never been notified of the original accident or of the suits filed
in an Illinois court by the injured person and the insured against
the original company. The reinsurer's right to maintain a federal
action disclaiming liability was sustained by the district court
and the circuit court of appeals which, by Judge Huxman, laid
down a general rule which in my opinion presents a correct state-
ment of the law. It reads:
"Ordinarily a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter
and over the parties to a justiciable controversy must exercise that
jurisdiction. This is, however, not an absolute mandate and the
court has some discretionary power as to whether it will in each
instance assume and exercise the jurisdiction which the statute
confers. Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 760,
763, 51 S. Ct. 304, 306, 75 L. Ed. 684; Canada Malting Co., Ltd.
v. Paterson Steantships, Ltd., 285 U. S. 413, 52 S. Ct. 413, 76
L. Ed. 837; Aterican Automobile Ins. Co. v. 1reundl et al., 7
Cir., 103 F. 2d 613; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Koch, 3 Cir., 102 F. 2d 288.
"Where a prior action has been filed in a court of concurrent
jurisdiction between the same parties and involving the same
issues, and a decision by that court would adjudicate all the rights
of the parties, a federal court, although having jurisdiction to
entertain an action brought by a defendant in the pending cause,
may within its discretionary powers refuse to entertain jurisdic-
tion. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Quarles, 4 Cir., 92 F. 2d
321; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Consumers Finance Service, Inc.,
3 Cir., 101 F. 2d 514; Aetna Casualty & Suretv Co. v. Yealls.
4 Cir., 99 F. 2d 665.
"But a federal court may not refuse to assume jurisdiction
merely on the ground that another remedy is available or because
another suit is pending, if the controversy between the parties will
not necessarily be determined therein. Maryland Casualty Co. v.
Consumers Finance Serice, Itnc., supra."
In the earlier state action in the Excess Insurance Company
Case, the parties were different and the issues were different. That
alone was sufficient to justify the federal suit, the decision in
which is now pending on certiorari before the United States
Supreme Court.
T4Excess Ins. Co. of America v. Brillhart, (C.C.A. 10th Cir. 1941)
121 F. (2d) 776.
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Co~cLusloN
It is hoped that this analysis will have helped slightly to
clarify the cases in which declaratory relief may properly be
refused in the federal courts, in the presence of a state action
involving somewhat related, if not identical issues. While judicial
economy is the touchstone for entertaining federal jurisdiction,
the discretion, never unlimited or unreviewable, has to a consider-
able extent been hardened into rule, so that predictability is within
limits possible. Used with discretion and where a useful purpose
is manifest, declaratory relief ministers to a social need. Used for
other purposes by insurance companies, its employment will arouse
justifiable criticism.
